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  The impact of excise taxes on cigarette consumption 
 
 
 An estimated 45.3 million, or 19.3% of American adults smoke cigarettes 
according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.  The deleterious health 
effects of smoking have been extensively researched and documented by scientists and 
doctors worldwide. Due to the passage of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, the U.S. Surgeon 
General’s health warning is stamped on every pack of cigarettes (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention). Yet, despite the flood of information on the dangers of smoking 
cigarettes, approximately 3,800 youths under the age of 18 start smoking every day. This 
is more than enough to replace the approximately 1,200 people that die in the United 
States each day due to smoking related causes (US Department of Health and Human 
Services). The rates in decline for first times smokers have become stagnant. Public 
Health experts, physicians, and legislators routinely propose various methods of 
decreasing cigarette consumption. Cigarette smoking is a grave public health concern 
from a health and economic perspective, and although numerous public policy initiatives 
have been directed at reducing cigarette consumption, one of the most widely used 
methods has been the taxation of cigarette smoking at both the federal and the state 
levels.  
Methodology: 
This paper seeks to examine the effectiveness of state excise taxes on packs of 
cigarettes as a way to inhibit their consumption. Through literature review, demand 
elasticity analysis, and by use of multivariable regression, the efficiency and 
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effectiveness of higher excise taxes as a public health measure are analyzed. The paper is 
organized as follows: the next section briefly traces the history in the U.S. of cigarette 
consumption, associated health issues and its taxation. The third and fourth sections of 
the paper discuss the previous research on the efficiency and incidence effects of 
cigarette taxation, and the data used in the empirical analysis. The final sections of the 
paper discuss the empirical model of the determinants of cigarette smoking, the results of 
the estimation, and conclude with a public policy recommendation on tax rates and public 
health expenditures based on regression results. Consumption rates and excise tax rates 
will be analyzed on a state- by-state basis.  
 
History: 
 Tobacco use in the United States is older than the country itself. Primarily used by 
Native Americans for medicinal and ceremonial purposes, most Europeans did not begin 
using tobacco products until the mid 1500s. It was not until 1612, that the first successful 
commercial crop was grown in the Virginia colony (CNN). By the mid 18th century, 
Virginia was producing thousands of tons of tobacco per year. In England, tobacco 
imports increased from 38 million pounds to 100 million pounds per year between 1700 
and 1770 (Mukherjee 240).   
The apocryphal origin of the cigarette was in 1855 during the Crimean War, when 
a soldier in Turkey used a piece of newspaper to smoke tobacco after exhausting his 
supply of pipes. Although using paper to pack tobacco was not a novel idea, Siddhartha 
Mukherjee notes, “The context was pivotal: the war had squeezed soldiers from three 
continents into a narrow, blasted peninsula, and habits and mannerisms were destined to 
 Benson 4 
spread quickly through its trenches like viruses (240).” The use of paper to smoke 
tobacco spread through Europe, and finally to the United States. After the Civil War, the 
use of cigarettes gained in popularity due to decreased production costs. In 1876, Allen 
and Ginter, a tobacco company in Virginia offered a prize to an innovator who could 
make a machine that would increase the production of cigarettes. Prior to 1876, cigarettes 
were hand-rolled and consequently expensive due to high labor costs. James Albert 
Bonsack developed a machine that created 70,000 cigarettes in 10 hours. Allen and 
Ginter rejected his design, weary that market demand was not great enough, and there 
would be a surplus of cigarettes. However, James “Buck” Duke eventually bought the 
machine, and later became the president of the American Tobacco Company in 1889 
(Witschi 5). Tobacco consumption skyrocketed. In 1870, the per capita consumption was 
less than one cigarette per year; by 1953 the average American consumed 3,500 
cigarettes per year (Mukherjee 241).  
 Little was known about the health effects of tobacco use until the early 1900s. 
The primary problem, notes Siddhartha Mukherjee in his book The Emperor of all 
Maladies is that as cigarette usage became nearly ubiquitous in the United States, it 
became difficult to discern the association between cancer and tobacco use. As a risk 
factor becomes so prevalent in the population, it no longer presents itself as a risk factor 
(Mukherjee 241). Published in 1930, The Springer Handbook of Special Pathology noted 
the increase in malignant lung cancer, predominately in men. Experts proposed multiple 
explanations for the rise in incidence such as the asphalting of roads, gas exposure from 
World War I, urban living, and the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918. But, no 
explanation could be made as to why lung cancer rates increased the same amount in 
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countries that had not been exposed to these factors. Smoking was suggested as a 
potential factor, with the caveat that many studies prior could find no plausible link 
(Witschi 4).  
 The first comprehensive study that strongly indicated a link between smoking and 
lung cancer was performed in the United Kingdom in 1951. Austin Bradford Hill, a 
biostatistician and Richard Doll, a medical researcher utilized the physician records from 
the National Health Service database. From October 1951-March 1954, 789 deaths 
occurred in the cohort, of those 789 deaths, 36 of the deaths were attributable to lung 
cancer, and all 36 people who had died were smokers (Mukherjee 249). The link between 
lung cancer and smoking was no longer deniable, although this did not deter many from 
smoking. In 1963, at the peak of consumption, the average American smoked 4,345 
cigarettes per year, approximately 12 cigarettes per day (Tauras 361).  
 Today, lung cancer is the leading cause of cancer death in the United States, and 
smoking causes approximately 90% of lung cancer deaths in men, and 80% of lung 
cancer deaths in women (National Cancer Institute). There are many proposals on how to 
decrease the prevalence of cigarette consumption in the United States; among them is a 
tax on cigarettes as a financial disincentive.  
Taxation on cigarettes did not begin as a corrective tax, but rather as a federal 
measure to increase revenue for the Civil War in 1864 (The Tax Foundation). The current 
federal excise tax is $1.01 per pack of cigarettes. The average pack of cigarettes in the 
United States contains 20 individual cigarettes and costs $5.98 including the federal sales 
tax.  The highest combined state and local tax rate for a pack of cigarettes is in New York 
City, with a combined total of $5.85 per pack. New York State also has the highest excise 
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tax rate at $4.35 per pack. The lowest excise tax rate is in Missouri, at $0.17 tax per pack. 
The Centers for Disease Control & Prevention estimate that smoking- caused health 
morbidity is $10.47 per pack sold and consumed in the United States (Boonn). This 
means that the cost of disease and disability due to smoking is equal to $10.47 per pack.  
The following chart, from the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (Figure 1.1) 
shows respective excise tax rates per state as of 2012, and ranks them highest to lowest; it 
does not include local tax rates, which some municipalities (eg. New York City, Chicago) 
also impose. 
(Figure 1.1) 
 
Elasticity Analysis:  
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Whether or not the taxation of cigarettes is ultimately successful at reducing 
consumption is a function of the elasticity of demand for cigarettes.  Moreover, elasticity 
is also used to assess economic incidence, the measure of who bears the burden of a tax. 
Elasticity provides the measure of the ability to escape a particular tax. The elasticity of 
demand measures the sensitivity of demand of a product to a change in the price level. It 
is measured as:  
  
  
 
The more elastic the demand, the easier it is for consumers to escape the burden 
of the tax, because as the prices increase, consumers will turn to other product substitutes, 
thus the burden of the tax is borne by suppliers. Conversely, greater inelasticity of 
demand places the burden on the consumers because they cannot easily substitute for 
other products (Rosen 282-283). Previous studies have placed the elasticity of demand 
for cigarettes between –0.14 to –1.23; with the majority of the studies estimating that 
elasticity was between –0.20 to –0.50 (Tauras 361). There are variations in elasticity, 
including sex, age, income, etc. The highly addictive nature of cigarettes leads to low 
price elasticity, and nearly the entire burden of a tax is borne by smokers (Tauras 361).  
 Changes in cigarette consumption are difficult to measure from a national 
standpoint, because some cigarette taxes are under the jurisdiction of states. Additionally, 
states increased their taxes at different times. For example, the most recent increase in 
New York occurred in 2010, while the most recent tax change in Louisiana occurred in 
2002. The amount of a tax also impacts consumption, for example, a tax increase of $1 
per pack may have more of a burden than a tax increase of $.05.  This analysis measures 
Ed = %∆Qd  
        %∆P 
 
Ed >1: elastic 
     E d<1: inelastic 
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the change in percent of adults who reported smoking in the year pre-tax and post-tax 
increase. Data is extracted from the State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation 
(STATE) System, run by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention utilizing data 
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The measurement of 
quantity demanded is the percent of adults aged 18-64 who reported smoking. The 
percent change indicated in the demand elasticity equation could be related to a variety of 
factors in addition to the change in tax rate, such as social, political or economic 
pressures. For the purpose of this paper, the model will analyze demand elasticity in three 
states during a period of changing tax rates: New York, Ohio, and Louisiana. These three 
states represent the highest, median, and one of the lowest excise tax rates.  The years 
measured will be 2009-2010 in New York, 2004-2005 in Ohio, and 2001-2002 in 
Louisiana. The elasticity will predictably be similar for each of the states as it is a 
measure subject to change in price within the state, not relative to other areas. These 
calculations will be extrapolated to estimate a general measure of elasticity that will be 
used throughout this paper. The data was derived from tax changes, and the rate was 
measured the year before the change and year after the increase in price.  
 
Calculations: 
New York (2010) tax increase $1.60:  
 
 
 
Ohio (2005) tax increase $.70:  
Ed = (15.5-18.0/15.5) 
 ($4.35-$2.75/$2.75)        
 
Ed =  -.28 
 
Ed = (22.3-25.9/22.3)        
($1.25-$.55/$.55) 
 
Ed = -.13 
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Louisiana (2002) tax increase $.12: 
 
 
  
The above calculations demonstrate the price insensitivity of cigarettes.  These 
measures are consistent with prior research that placed the elasticity of demand for 
cigarettes between -.14 and -1.23, with the majority falling between -.20 and -.50 (Tauras 
361). This makes cigarettes ideal for both a corrective tax as well as an important source 
of revenue. As predicted, consumption decreased slightly, but not significantly. 
 
Review of Literature:  
 Given the inelastic nature of cigarettes, they have been subject to the “sin tax,” 
which is a corrective tax on goods that are considered undesirable or harmful. Since 
cigarettes have historically been taxed, there is a great deal of literature on how taxation 
impacts cigarette consumption. However, much of the literature does not use recent data 
and focuses on the economic impact of the tax, not on the behavioral impact of the tax. 
Economic impact refers to how the tax impacts federal and state budgets, on the receiving 
end of the tax, as opposed to the payment end of the tax impacting behavior of smokers. 
For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that a cigarette tax will improve 
the federal budget by increasing revenue and decreasing medical costs due to smoking 
related causes. The CBO used a flat tax of .50 cents in its analysis (Congressional Budget 
Office).  
Ed = (23.9-24.6/23.9)        
($.36- $.24/$.24) 
Ed = -.06 
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  Due to the addictive properties of cigarettes, the demand for them is not sensitive 
to price, and although there is some reduction in consumption because of increased taxes, 
smokers often find other ways to avoid the tax. A great deal of the literature focuses on 
the behavioral changes in smokers caused by taxation. One study by Jérôme Adda and 
Francesca Cornaglia examines the true homogeneity of cigarettes as a uniform product, 
and also questions the rational addiction model. This Rational Addiction model was 
proposed by Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy in 1988, it states that an addict knows the 
manner in which the good affects him or her, and consumes more because that maximizes 
the addict’s discounted utility. Becker and Murphy claim that, “addictions, even strong 
ones, are rational in the sense of involving forward-thinking maximization with stable-
preferences (1).”  Basically, a person who smokes a cigarette, under this model, 
understands that it will lead him or her to smoke again tomorrow, and the following day, 
etc. and does so because present gains are greater than future costs. A rational addict 
compares the benefit of smoking to the total discounted costs, including monetary and 
health costs in the future. Therefore, in this model, if taxes go up, an addict will smoke 
less because future costs increase relative to present benefits. The rational addiction 
model has been a major focus of economic literature, but Adda and Cornaglia’s evidence 
shows that people do not act “rationally.”  
 Cigarettes are not a consistent product. Brands differ in content, the amount of 
additives, and size, and this is often reflected in price differences. Smokers can also 
moderate the amount of consumption per cigarette. By altering the number of puffs, 
length of puffs, or reducing ventilation. This compensatory behavior is not caught in a 
statistical analysis, but could reduce the efficacy of the tax, if the tax is for public health 
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purposes.  The conclusion of the study is “that a one percent increase in taxes increases 
the smoking intensity by about 0.4%.”  This behavior is more prevalent among low-
income individuals. Adda and Cornaglia note “Individuals with higher education extract 
less nicotine from a given cigarette. An additional year of education leads to a two 
percent decrease in smoking intensity.” Therefore, taxes may not reduce the number of 
smokers, but rather shift consumption patterns to more “intense” smoking and to cheaper 
cigarettes.  (Adda, Cornaglia 1013-1028).  
 Consumption patterns changed in response to tax increases. One study highlights 
COMMIT (Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation), a survey by the 
National Cancer Institute. The cohort was originally interviewed in 1993, and again in 
2001. The study indicated that rather than reducing smoking, a majority of smokers 
simply bought less expensive cigarettes as taxes increased. Methods of obtaining cheaper 
cigarettes include traveling to adjacent states, buying generic cigarettes instead of 
premium cigarettes, and traveling to Native American reservations. For example, “a 
survey of western New York adult smokers in 2002-2003 found that 67% of smokers 
reported that they usually purchase their cigarettes from an Indian reservation, where the 
average cigarette price was 40% that of an off- reservation convenience store.” (Hyland, 
Bauer, Li, Abrams, Higbee, Peppone, Cummings 91).  
 Critics of taxes often cite the inherently regressive nature of consumption taxes as 
an argument against raising tax rates. Moreover, theoretically, a cigarette tax violates 
both horizontal and vertical equity. Lower-income individuals must pay a greater 
proportion of their income on cigarettes, violating vertical equity. Second, individuals of 
the same income strata are taxed differently if one person smokes, and the other does not, 
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a violation of horizontal equity (Wilson and Thomson). Critics also argue that the tax 
would be justifiable if money went back into tobacco cessation or prevention programs, 
but tax revenue most often goes into a general government fund (Wilson and Thomson). 
Proponents of the tax who argue that the cigarette tax is progressive say that low-income 
individuals are more sensitive to price changes, and therefore more likely to quit 
smoking. However, low-income individuals will compensate by buying less expensive 
cigarettes, or altering consumption behavior-such as smoking past the filter, and 
increasing the length of “puffs” (Adda and Cornaglia). In 2008, one study estimated that 
smokers in the lowest 33% of the population spent 7.7% of their income on cigarettes, 
while the middle income spent 3.1%, and highest income spent 1.4% (Farrelly, 
Nonnemaker and Watson).  
Model and Data: 
 
In this regression, the dependent (Y) variable is the number of adults in each state 
who are current smokers. This is a useful measurement because it accounts for the 
number of people within the state who are considered smokers. The data in this 
regression is taken from the BRFSS Survey in 2011. The model will seek to analyze the 
impact of independent variables on the dependent variable. The first independent variable 
is state excise tax rates, since the main focus of this paper is to examine the relationship 
between taxes and consumption. The second variable is public health expenditures, using 
this data is important because policy solutions to counter taxation are often based in 
increased spending. Tracking public health spending per capita by state will be not only 
indicative of health promotion and disease prevention in that state, but it also shows how 
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effective the funding is relative to the rate. Also, the greater amount of revenue spent on 
public health relative to tax rates, the stronger the argument for the progressivity of 
cigarette taxes (Wilson and Thomson). The other variable is the percentage of adults 
below the poverty level. The cigarette tax is commonly cited inherently regressive 
because low-income people smoke more, logically, states with higher levels of poverty 
will have higher smoking rates. 
A study by the Mackinac Center, a policy think tank in Michigan found that 
60.9% of cigarettes consumed in New York State had been smuggled into the state. Using 
the percentage of cigarettes smuggled into and out of states is an important variable to 
show the unintended consequences of a tax, and it is an individual behavioral change that 
has economic implications, such as a loss of tax revenues to other states (LaFaive and 
Nesbit).  
 The last variable is alcohol consumption. The data is taken from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention through the BRFSS Survey. This paper predicts that 
cigarettes and alcohol are complements rather than substitutes, meaning as the demand 
for alcohol increases, the demand for cigarettes will also increase.  
The variables chosen were done so to reduce multicollinearity. For example, an 
interesting variable would be Medicaid spending per state, however that would likely be 
confounded with the poverty variable skewing the results of the study. 
Et ceteris peribus, there will be a negative correlation between cigarette 
consumption and the percentage of public health expenditures; as expenditures increase it 
should decrease consumption. Public Health expenditures are not, however, a measure of 
efficacy and so there is not a metric to demonstrate how effective public health 
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interventions are in decreasing cigarette consumption. There will also be an inverse 
relationship between tax rates and smoking rates, as taxes increase, smoking should 
decrease slightly. 
 Et ceteris peribus there will be a positive relationship between poverty and 
smoking rates. There will also be a correlation between percentage of cigarettes that have 
been smuggled and taxes. Predictably, taxes will distort behavior and cause residents in 
states with high taxes to seek cheaper alternatives. According to the LaFaive and Nesbit, 
60% of cigarettes consumed in New York State, where taxes are the highest in the nation 
are smuggled into the state. New Hampshire had the highest percent of cigarettes 
smuggled out of state. The geographic proximity to states with lower tax rates relative to 
higher tax rates will drive people to seek cigarettes elsewhere. The data table on the 
appendix shows the positive percentages, which represent an inflow of cigarettes. The 
negative numbers represent and outflow of cigarettes.  
 The following regression (page 15) will analyze the relationship between these 
variables. From the regression results, an efficacy analysis and public policy 
recommendation will be made regarding expenditures on public health and taxes on 
cigarettes. The recommendation will use literature reviewed above as well the regression 
results in this paper.  
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SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.6647452
R Square 0.4418862
Adjusted R Square 0.3798736
Standard Error 2.7089644
Observations 51
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 261.4609697 52.29219 7.12574 5.54005E-05
Residual 45 330.2319714 7.338488
Total 50 591.6929412
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 18.283716 4.041884761 4.523562 4.4E-05 10.14294213 26.42449
Excise Tax -1.124608 0.46025216 -2.44346 0.01853 -2.05160318 -0.1976123
PH Spending -2.45E-09 1.04575E-09 -2.33945 0.02381 -4.5527E-09 -3.402E-10
Smuggling as % of Consumption 0.0537591 0.130286409 0.412622 0.68184 -0.2086512 0.3161694
Poverty Rate 0.3488356 0.140336576 2.485707 0.01671 0.066183208 0.631488
Alcohol  Consumption -5.610795 5.451971744 -1.02913 0.30892 -16.5916297 5.3700399  
Analysis:  
 The regression was a standard Ordinary Lease Squares (OLS) model. All 
variables were tested at the 95% confidence level. Significance is therefore measured by 
p-values less than or equal to .05. The entire model is highly significant given the 
significant F of .0000554, meaning that the explanatory variables account for a 
significant amount of the variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, much of the 
change in smoking rates can be attributed to public health spending, taxes, and poverty. 
Alcohol consumption and smuggling were both insignificant variables in the model. A 
possible explanation for the insignificance is that the alcohol data was extracted from the 
most recent BRFSS, and many states have laws that ban smoking in public places, 
including bars, casinos, and restaurants. Currently 25 states and Washington D.C. have 
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enacted smoking bans. In 2000, there were zero states with bans. Several states currently 
have partial smoke-free laws (Cevallos). Since the data was taken from the 2011 survey, 
after some of the states had implemented smoke-free laws, there may be less of a 
correlation between the rates of smoking and alcohol consumption, resulting in 
insignificance.  
 In a regression between only excise tax rates and smoking rates, the adjusted R 
squared was .246, meaning that taxes account for approximately 25% of the difference in 
smoking rates between states. It is also negatively correlated and significant with a  
p-value of .01853. Another significant variable was public health spending. The p-value 
was significant at the .05 level with .024323, and negatively correlated with smoking 
rates. There is some weakness in this variable because the public health spending by state 
accounts for the total amount of spending on all issues, not limited only to tobacco 
cessation and smoking prevention. However, the correlation is still relevant, and the 
amount a state spends on public health is related to the smoking rate in that state. The 
policy recommendation in the next section will elaborate on the efficacy of public health  
spending.  
 There is also a significant and positive correlation between the percentage of 
citizens in each state in poverty and consumption of cigarettes. The p-value is .01671, 
significant at the 5% confidence level. This has implications in policy the model shows 
that lower income individuals not only spend more of their relative income on cigarettes 
but that they also smoke more. This has several implications in terms of the equity of the 
cigarette excise tax, and also on future medical costs for low-income populations.  
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 The final variable, smuggling as a percent of consumption in the state was 
insignificant at the 5% confidence level, although the sign was positive, as predicted. 
There are a number of reasons that the smuggling data in this model could not fully 
explain the relevance of the variable. First, it is more likely that smuggling is related to 
the tax than it is the smoking rate, so there is a degree of multicollinearity. Running a 
regression with only the excise tax rates and smuggling data, the variable was still 
insignificant and the sign was positive. One potential problem with this is that smuggling 
is part of the “underground economy” and so true figures may not be fully representative. 
The second is that the range of data in the smuggling set is very wide, ranging from  
-60.94% in New York State (meaning approximately 61% of cigarettes in New York 
State are smuggled into the state), to 26.84% in New Hampshire, (meaning 
approximately 27% of cigarettes in New Hampshire are smuggled out of the state) 
(LaFaive and Nesbit). The wide range of these variables puts stains on the standard OLS 
model, particularly when measured as a percent, which technically only ranges from 0%-
100%. This causes the problem of “truncated errors,” which occurs when an infinite sum 
is measured within finite bounds. The wide range of data for smuggling could have put 
strain on the percentage bounds, which only range from 0%-100%. Given the analysis of 
the data, and significant correlation of certain variables with the dependent smoking rates, 
the following policy analysis will focus on three areas; public health spending, taxes, and 
poverty.  
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Policy Recommendation:  
 One of the main reasons for government intervention in the market is to correct 
market failures, or control externalities. Cigarette smoking causes a negative spillover 
cost to society, through higher medical costs not borne by the patient, secondhand smoke, 
adverse selection in the health insurance pool, and fire and safety hazards (Ross, and 
Chaloupka 6). The marginal social costs of cigarette consumption outweigh the marginal 
social benefits (e.g., personal utility), and so the government taxes cigarettes.  
 Ross and Chaloupka also argue that the government intervenes because there is 
information asymmetry in the market for cigarettes. For example, less educated people 
tend to be less health literate and often do not personalize the risks associated with 
smoking. According to the constrained maximization model, under which the rational 
addict model also applies, a consumer cannot maximize utility without sufficient 
information on a good (Ross and Chaloupka 6).  
 There are three primary methods of intervention, the first is taxation, the second is 
public health spending and education, and the final is by smoking restrictions. Smoke-
free policies have lead to a 5-15% reduction in population smoking rates, and smoke-free 
workplace laws reduced prevalence up to 20%, these movements were particularly strong 
in changing social norms around smoking, especially the youth population (Ross and 
Chaloupka). Currently, 25 states and the District of Columbia have smoke-free laws in 
place, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that by 2020, the entire 
country will have smoke-free laws (Cevallos).  
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 Tobacco tax revenues were $17,267,568 in 2010 according to the Tax Policy 
Center at the Urban Institute and Brookings Institute. The Centers for Disease Control 
estimated that only 2.4% of the total tax revenue from cigarette excise taxes was spent on 
smoking related public health prevention. This further exacerbates the regressivity of the 
tax, as low-income individuals are now paying more essentially into general funds. 
Wilson and Thompson argue that the regressive nature of the tax could be offset by using 
revenues to fund programs that have greater benefit to low income populations, such as 
inner city school funding, health literacy campaigns, or public health campaigns.  
 A perverse disincentive arises when one policy action creates not only an 
unintended consequence, but actually can exacerbate the problem that the policy 
originally set out to alleviate. Medicaid is a social program meant to help low income 
populations, primarily women and children to obtain medical care. If prescribing to the 
rational addiction model (an addict weighs costs and benefits, choosing to consume if 
benefits outweigh costs), then increased spending on tobacco cessation and on programs 
such as Medicaid will discount future costs to a present-day smoker. Thus, spending on 
reactionary medicine and reducing the future cost to the smoker could entice one to 
consume more. According to the CDC in 2010,  “Medicaid enrollees have nearly twice 
the smoking rates (37%) of the general adult population (21%), and smoking-related 
medical costs are responsible for 11% of Medicaid expenditures.” Thus, a distinction 
must be made between public health and medical spending. Public Health has the primary 
purpose of prevention of a disease at a population level, and this approach reduces the 
perverse disincentive in health spending.  
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 The most effective policy will aim to reduce the excess burden of the tax by 
making the tax difficult to avoid, or evade. One way to do this is by raising the federal 
excise tax rate in addition to the state tax rate. The policy should reduce the negative 
spillover effects of smoking, one of the most effective methods of reducing secondhand 
smoke is by instituting smoke-free laws in public places. Lastly, the tax revenue from 
cigarettes should be redistributed more equitably across incomes, and a greater percent of 
spending should go towards preventative health and public health services. It should be 
noted that there are positives to cigarette consumption aside from personal utility. The 
first is employment and the second is tax revenue. Therefore, excise tax policy cannot 
outlaw cigarettes or make them too expensive because according to the World Lung 
Foundation, the tobacco industry has revenues of approximately $35 billion annually.  
Conclusion: 
 Cigarette taxes account for a statistically significant variation in the smoking 
rates, showing that taxes are effective in reducing smoking to a certain amount. However, 
if government seeks to correct the market failures related to cigarette consumption a 
comprehensive approach must be enacted. The most effective policy will combine a tax 
increase with public health expenditures and smoking bans that will change behavior. 
One aspect of smoking prevention that this paper does not elaborate a great deal on is 
stopping youth smoking rates.  
More research should be dedicated to the impact of taxes on smuggling, as the 
model in this report did not elucidate a clear relationship. In conclusion, taxes are the 
most effective way to reduce consumption at the present time, yet that does mean it is an 
effective measure.  
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Appendix A 
State Smoking Rate Excise Tax PH Spending Smuggling as % of C  Poverty Rate Alcohol (Any) Consumption (BR  
Alabama 21.9 $0.43 $335,488,409.00 7.70% 16.4 41.30%
Alaska 20.4 $2.00 $55,550,000.00 0.00% 12 58.20%
Arizona 15 $2.00 $54,120,500.00 -54.39% 19.1 56.20%
Arkansas 22.9 $1.15 $149,800,388.00 -9.60% 17.6 42.10%
California 12.1 $0.87 $2,415,831,000.00 -36.08% 16.2 57.10%
Colorado 16 $0.84 $183,551,436.00 -16.22% 12.6 64.30%
Connecticut 13.2 $3.40 $79,551,713.00 -22.25% 9 64.30%
Delware 17.3 $1.60 $28,791,300.00 22.95% 12.7 59.50%
DC* 15.6 $2.50 $55,676,000.00 0.00% 19.1 67.40%
Florida 17.1 $1.40 $441,688,341.00 -19.10% 15.1 56.90%
Georgia 17.6 $0.37 $162,837,455.00 4.10% 18.5 50.80%
Hawaii 14.5 $3.20 $210,580,163.00 0.00% 12.3 53.10%
Idaho 15.7 $0.57 $122,845,700.00 19.88% 14.4 48.90%
Illinois 16.9 $1.98 $297,742,900.00 -2.31% 13.8 60.70%
Indiana 21.2 $1.00 $83,710,931.00 3.07% 16 51.60%
Iowa 16.1 $1.36 $51,790,348.00 -21.32 10.5 60.60%
Kansas 17 $0.79 $43,092,255.00 -18.37% 14.2 51.60%
Kentucky 24.8 $0.60 $192,860,700.00 7.18% 16.9 43.10%
Louisiana 22.1 $0.36 $225,294,657.00 -5.12% 18.9 49.60%
Maine 18.2 $2.00 $31,434,509.00 -13.65% 12.5 60.50%
Maryland 15.2 $2.00 $173,747,000.00 -25.76% 9.9 57.80%
Massachusetts 14.1 $2.51 $350,186,952.00 -18.11% 10.8 64.50%
Michigan 18.9 $2.00 $205,877,200.00 -29.34% 14.9 57.60%
Minnesota 14.9 $1.23 $64,815,000.00 -19.48% 10.6 63.60%
Mississippi 22.9 $0.68 $25,875,597.00 -10.13% 21 42.10%
Missouri 21.1 $0.17 $35,311,567.00 12.32% 15.3 52.50%
Montana 18.8 $1.70 $24,180,994.00 -23.52% 14.8 58.70%
Nebraska 17.2 $0.64 $72,785,962.00 -5.40% 10.1 61.80%
Nevada 21.3 $0.80 $9,307,757.00 20.02% 15 57.00%
New Hampshire 16.9 $1.68 $21,026,483.00 26.83% 7.3 65.80%
New Jersey 14.1 $2.70 $236,625,000.00 -18.07% 10.6 61.40%
New Mexico 18.5 $1.66 $105,036,600.00 -52.95% 19.9 51.00%
New York 15.5 $4.35 $1,361,874,065.00 -60.94% 15.9 60.10%
North Carolina 19.8 $0.45 $132,055,198.00 0.00% 16.6 48.00%
North Dakota 17.4 $0.44 $16,939,076.00 1.55% 11.2 62.40%
Ohio 22.5 $1.25 $175,566,137.00 -8.98% 14.8 55.90%
Oklahoma 23.7 $1.03 $135,791,000.00 -4.55% 14.4 45.60%
Oregon 15.1 $1.18 $52,141,850.00 -15.66% 14 59.40%
Pennsylvania 18.4 $1.60 $190,456,000.00 -3.35% 12 57.20%
Rhode Island 15.7 $3.50 $50,815,757.00 -39.75% 13.5 62.50%
South Carolina 21 $0.57 $81,225,679.00 2.47% 16.6 47.00%
South Dakota 15.4 $1.53 $24,558,841.00 -28.61% 14.4 58.80%
Tennessee 20.1 $0.62 $278,401,400.00 2.40% 16.5 37.50%
Texas 15.8 $1.41 $521,636,021.00 -33.76% 17.7 54.30%
Utah 9.1 $1.70 $84,410,000.00 -31.95% 10.2 29.50%
Vermont 15.4 $2.62 $43,951,667.00 16.87% 10.6 65.10%
Virginia 18.5 $0.30 $295,499,639.00 24.73% 10.9 56.00%
Washington 15.2 $3.03 $265,838,500.00 -48.47% 11.9 57.90%
West Virginia 26.8 $0.55 $132,295,059.00 20.79% 16.7 31.80%
Wisconsin 19.1 $2.52 $52,826,100.00 -36.39% 11.3 67.10%
Wyoming 19.5 $0.60 $33,852,718.00 20.35% 9.8 54.00%
Data 
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